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Clouded Diamonds:
Without Binding Arbitration
and More Sophisticated Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms,
the Kimberley Process Will
Ultimately Fail in Ending Conflicts
Fueled By Blood Diamonds
Shannon K. Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
"In America, it's bling bling but out here it's bling bang."'
Conflict diamonds, the so-called "blood diamonds" mined in the
resource-rich nations of Africa, have led to the displacement and death of
millions.2 The decolonization of Africa and the arbitrary boundaries left by
Europeans created a power vacuum and unnatural divide amongst people,
creating the perfect breeding grounds for rebel movements. 3 These counter-
government forces use fear and poverty to drive the African peasantry to
illegally mine rough diamonds.4 These diamonds are then sold back to the
rebel forces that use the exorbitant profits to further fuel their reign of
* Shannon K. Murphy received her Juris Doctor in December 2010 from Pepperdine University
School of Law. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in both Philosophy and Political Science
from the University of San Diego in 2008.
1. BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Brothers Pictures 2006).
2. See Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberly Process
Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade
Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REv. 217, 223, 231-32 (2005).
3. See id. at 221.
4. See Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the
Nature ofLaw, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 835, 840 (2003).
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oppression-fanning the flames of anarchy within the infantile nations.
These rough diamonds, the sale of which would enable the building of
infrastructure and the establishment of society, have turned into a curse for
the countries in which they are found. These plagued African nations are
hemorrhaging resources and potential for profits while the rebels usurp the
blood, power, and labor of a people desperate to survive.6 For many,
diamonds are the key to rebuilding Africa.7 Those who control the diamond
mines are the keepers of the keys to a new African continent.
Polished diamonds abound in America. They are celebrations of
accomplishment and love. But as global awareness of the conflicts in Africa
continues to increase, diamonds are held to a new standard of clarity.
Consumers continue to investigate the new clouds in their diamonds-how
distasteful it is to sport a diamond, the sale of which funds murder and
oppression. But while awareness among consumers is spreading, it is not
spreading fast enough.
In 2003, under an initiative of the United Nations (U.N.), various
nations of the world gave life to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS)-a method by which consumers of all levels could know the origin
of their diamonds-with the Scheme only certifying those harvested from
legal, government-run mines.9 The Scheme's drafters believed that, if given
the choice, consumers would choose to buy diamonds mined legally, with
profits flowing to legitimate sources of power.'o However, the KPCS as it
stands is voluntary and lacks the teeth needed to deter its violators." The
KPCS lacks a binding arbitration agreement and needs a more articulate and
sophisticated method of resolving disputes and violations among its
signatory countries. This article will offer suggestions for increasing the
efficiency of the KPCS.
Part II provides an explanation of the problem of conflict diamonds,
including brief profiles of some of the most conflicted areas of Africa. Part
III highlights the relevancy of conflict diamonds to Americans. Part IV
explains the motivations for enacting the KPCS. Part V provides the
5. See Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley
Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 29 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 25, 28 (2005).
6. Fishman, supra note 2, at 219-21.
7. See Margo Kaplan, Note, Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the
Diamond Trade, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 559, 565 (2003).
8. See generally Fishman, supra note 2, at 224-28 (explaining how the negative publicity
surrounding blood diamonds led to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme).
9. See id. at 225-27.
10. See generally id. at 227 (explaining how the KPCS can ease the worries of purchasers).
I1. See id. at 234.
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relevant provisions of the KPCS. Part VI outlines the shortcomings of the
KPCS, including its voluntary nature, vague wording, and lack of dispute
resolution mechanism. Part VII describes the author's suggested
modifications to the KPCS, including an enhanced method of dispute
resolution and a binding arbitration clause. Part VIII concludes the article,
addressing future hurdles to be faced.
II. WHAT ARE CONFLICT DIAMONDS?
"Conflict diamonds, also known as 'blood' diamonds, are rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed conflicts
aimed at undermining legitimate governments" throughout the African
continent, with the primary trouble areas being the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Republic of Angola, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire (the
Ivory Coast).12 These diamond-fueled and diamond-funded conflicts have
"forced more than 6.5 million people from their homes in Sierra Leone,
Angola, and the DRC," and are responsible for the death of roughly 3.7
million people.13
The actual number of diamonds and the worth of these jewels, primarily
discussed in their rough form, is staggering. Roughly $8.5 billion worth of
diamonds are exported from the African continent each year, with over
sixty-five percent of the world's diamonds originating in African countries. 14
The United States Department of State estimates that the international rough
diamond trade generates $30 billion annually." Of this number, the global
trade of blood diamonds is worth approximately $300 million a year.' The
following paragraphs provide brief synopses of the role of conflict diamonds
in various African nations.
12. Kimberley Process Frequently Asked Questions,
http://kimberleyprocess.com/faqs/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
13. Fishman, supra note 2, at 231-32.
14. See World Diamond Council, Diamond Facts, http://diamondfacts.org/facts/index.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
15. See United States Department of State, Conflict Diamonds,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/diamonds (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
16. Fishman, supra note 2, at 219. This number (i.e. $300 million) is roughly 3%-15% of the
total trade of diamonds worldwide. Id. However, these numbers represent only ascertainable
percentages, and in actuality, the blood diamond trade may constitute a significantly larger portion of
the global diamond trade. Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 25 (2003).
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A. Republic ofAngola
Following its secession from Portugal in the mid-1970s, Angola was
split along the lines of two political factions vying for control of the
country's resources.' 7 From 1975 to 1989, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA), backed by the former Soviet Union, had
"virtually exclusive" control of the country's diamond mines.'8  Because
UNITA was receiving funds from the Soviets and the Angolan government
was backed by the United States, neither side was in short supply of
resources, thus allowing UNITA to stockpile diamonds for later sale. 9
However, UNITA was forced to sell the diamonds at the close of the Cold
War when the Soviets stopped supplying the necessary resources.20
The sales from these illicit diamonds are estimated to be $4 billion
between 1992 and 1998.21 UNITA has "turned larger profits from diamond
smuggling than any other Central African rebel group."22 Though the
country is currently in a relative state of peace, since 1999 there has been
evidence of UNITA's continued trade of diamonds for weapons, despite no
longer having actual control over the mines.23 This fact alone demonstrates
the fragility of the situation in Angola.
B. Sierra Leone
The most prosperous diamond mines in the world are in Sierra Leone.24
This wealth of natural resources has proven to be a curse, however, with the
country marred by a diamond-funded war from 1991 to 2002.25 The
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an insurgent group, maintained control
over most of the country's mines and traded the diamonds in exchange for
the essentials needed to fuel the rebel group's efforts.26 The RUF sold $25-
$125 million in rough diamonds each year to fuel its insurgent efforts,
17. Malamut, supra note 5, at 29.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Id.; see Kaplan, supra note 7, at 575.
22. Malamut, supra note 5, at 30.
23. Kaplan, supra note 7, at 565-66. Perhaps counter-intuitively, ceasefires have tended to
increase the production of conflict diamonds by providing the rebels with downtime in which to
stockpile more diamonds for later sales when armed conflict inevitably resumes. Malamut, supra
note 5, at 43.
24. Malamut, supra note 5, at 30-33; see also Price, supra note 16, at 12.
25. Malamut, supra note 5, at 30-31; see also Price, supra note 16, at 16.
26. Malamut, supra note 5, at 31.
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committing atrocious crimes that eventually brought the blood diamond
conflict to the global stage.27 By action of the United Nations Security
Council, Sierra Leone was sanctioned, faced a weapons embargo, and
subsequently was able to disarm the RUF.28 However, Sierra Leone remains
the largest U.N. peacekeeping effort with troops patrolling the diamond-rich
areas since 2002.29
C. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Though the UNITA in Angola has been deemed the most prosperous
and the land of Sierra Leone the most diamond-rich, "no place on Earth have
conflict diamonds wreaked more havoc than in the DRC."30 Africa's World
War, as it has been coined," has led to the death of an estimated 2.5 million
people in the DRC in just four years.32 The war in the DRC wages on today
despite U.N. recognition of the connection between the conflict and the
exploitation of diamond mines, with roughly $50-$60 million in rough
27. Id.; Price, supra note 16, at 15.
At the end of 1998, the London-based NGO Global Witness issued the first powerful and
vivid account of the nature of the African conflicts fueled by diamonds. That report set
off substantial press attention, even in the United States, primarily on the basis of the
guerillas' trademark atrocity of chopping off the hands or forearms of tribal villagers who
resisted their authority.. . . They also liked to burn people-adults and children-alive.
Feldman, supra note 4, at 840.
28. Malamut, supra note 5, at 31.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 32.
[The] DRC provides an exaggerated example of a country lacking the infrastructure
necessary to establish effective internal controls. While Sierra Leone and Angola have a
long history of poor governance and armed conflict, both countries have seen relative
peace in recent years, allowing for growing infrastructures. The DRC, on the other hand,
remains plagued by constant violence. In contrast to Angola where at least 50%-75% of
diamond mining takes place under formal government supervision, the DRC's recognized
mining sector accounts for only 25% of all official reports.
Id. at 50.
31. Price, supra note 16, at 16. The war was given this name because of the involvement of
troops from seven African nations including Zimbabwe, Chad, Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Burundi,
and Rwanda. Malamut, supra note 5, at 32.
32. Price, supra note 16, at 16 (calculating deaths from 1999-2003).
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diamonds smuggled out of the country each year.33  Until the country can
control more than this small portion of its resources, it will be hard pressed
to make meaningful progress in other sectors of government and society.
D. Republic of Ivory Coast
Until a failed coup d'6tat in 2002, the Republic of the Ivory Coast was
the fourth largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 34 Now the countr7 lies in
the midst of crisis with rebels controlling the diamond-rich north. Like
many African nations, the United Nations Security Council imposed a ban
on the importation of any diamonds coming from the Ivory Coast in 2004,
and subsequently renewed the ban in 2005.36 The U.N. reported that the
illicit diamonds were being smuggled through Ghana in violation of a U.N.
embargo. As of October 2009, the embargo on arms and rough diamonds,
as well as other sanctions, is still in place.3  The continued renewal of this
embargo, as well as accusations of foreign complicity and even importation
of illicit diamonds coming from the Ivory Coast, is evidence that the
situation in this country is far from resolved.
III. RELEVANCY OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS TO THE UNITED STATES
There are various reasons the United States should take a vested interest
in the legitimacy and efficiency of the diamond trade worldwide. First, the
33. Malamut, supra note 5, at 32-34. The diamonds are generally smuggled out of the DRC
into the Brazzaville, the capital of the Republic of Congo (ROC). Id. The ROC is an attractive
locale because of the already established trade routes, geographic proximity, and lower export taxes
than other African nations. Id.
34. Albena P. Petrova, The Implementation and Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme in the United States, 40 INT'L LAW. 945, 945 (2006).
35. Id
36. Id.; S.C. Res. 1643, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1643 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unscresolutions05.htm (follow "S/RES/1643 (2005)" hyperlink); S.C.
Res. 1572, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscresolutions04.html (follow "Security Council Resolution 1572
(2004)"hyperlink).
37. Reuters, Ivory Coast Rebels Deny Blood Diamond Trade, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 7, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16094952/. The U.N. estimates that the rebels of the Ivory Coast are
smuggling between $9-$23 million worth of diamonds. Id
38. Reuters, Israel Rejects UN Allegations It Exports 'Blood Diamonds', HAARETZ, Oct. 29,
2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1 124476.html.
39. Id. "Along with Israel, the panel . . .named the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Guinea[,]
and Liberia as some of the countries that needed to step up efforts to enforce a four-year-old U.N.
embargo on buying rough diamonds mined in the Ivory Coast." Id
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United States is the world's largest consumer of diamonds.4 0 As Americans
become increasingly conscious of their social responsibility as consumers,
knowing how their products are made and where they come from becomes
ever more important in their buying decisions. Wearing diamonds, the sale
of which funds anti-government movements and fuels the human rights
violations committed by these rebel organizations, is hardly viewed as en
vogue.
Second, from a political standpoint, the diamond trade is an integral
facet of Africa's ability to build its infrastructure, establish long-standing
governments, and free itself of its financial dependence on Western aid. As
a Western power with political, social, and economic ties to the continent,
the United States has a strong interest in the establishment of legitimate
governments and means of trade. The largest consumer of diamonds, the
United States, must combat conflict diamonds, the sale of which allows rebel
forces to undermine the very sources of power the United States supports.
Ending the illicit sale of conflict diamonds will not change the fate of
the African continent overnight. Converting the illicit diamond trade into a
government-regulated sector is very expensive-many African nations
simply do not have the funds. 41 Because these countries cannot afford to
spend money fighting off rebel forces, it is up to consumers to refuse to buy
illegitimate diamonds in the hope of driving the rebels out of business. Only
then will diamond-rich African nations be able to legitimately mine the
diamonds and use the funds to build infrastructure and eradicate the causes
of poverty that drive the peasant miners to sell the diamonds to the rebels.
Legitimizing the diamond industry holds infinite promise for the African
nations that house some of the richest diamond mines in the world.42
Under the Bush administration, Congress enacted the Clean Diamond
Trade Act of 2003, implementing the KPCS in the United States.43 The Act
40. The jewelry industry in the United States was estimated at $26 billion for the year 2000.
Fishman, supra note 2, at 231; Price, supra note 16, at 42.
41. Certain groups argue that "[d]iamond smuggling will continue to flourish for two reasons:
lack of governmental control over licensing, and the artisanal miner's extreme poverty levels."
Malamut, supra note 5, at 44.
42. According to the World Diamond Council, roughly ten million people worldwide are
directly or indirectly supported by the diamond industry, and over five million people have access to
healthcare because of diamond revenues. World Diamond Council, Diamond Facts,
http://diamondfacts.org/facts/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). In the DRC, roughly $40
million of taxes are unpaid each year. Fishman, supra note 2, at 220. Essentially, the government is
unable to benefit from the sales of the country's resources. Id.
43. Petrova, supra note 34, at 951. Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2003).
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itself states that roughly 3.7 million people have died in Africa as a result of
wars funded from the sale of conflict diamonds." This legal initiative
demonstrates the United States' willingness to partake in the effort to end
diamond-driven bloodshed.
IV. BIRTH OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The KPCS was ultimately adopted to "break the link between trade in
blood diamonds and armed conflict in Africa" and to help the legitimate
governments of these conflicted nations regain control of their nations'
natural resources, allowing them to rightfully profit off the sale of diamonds
in the hopes of building and rebuilding the infrastructure of their countries.45
By 2000, bad press; growing public awareness and outcry; and pressure
from NGOs, including Global Witness and Oxfam, "motivated the South
African government to summon all interested governments, members of the
diamond industry, and NGOs to meet and discuss ways to solve the blood
diamond problem."46 In late 2000, the United Nations General Assembly
voted unanimously in support of the KPCS, a diamond certification scheme
that had arisen from this and subsequent meetings.47 Two years later, thirty-
nine diamond-trading countries officially adopted the KPCS at Interlaken,
Switzerland, and on January 1, 2003, all participating countries implemented
the Scheme. 48  Currently, the KPCS has forty-nine member states
representing seventy-five countries, with the European Union and its
member states counting as an individual participant.49
V. THE LOGISTICS OF THE KPCS
The preamble of the KPCS denotes its purpose as countering the
"devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on
the pace, safety[,] and security of people in affected countries and the
systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in
44. Clean Diamond Trade Act § 3901.
45. Fishman, supra note 2, at 233.
46. Id. at 224. The group met in Kimberley, South Africa, thus giving the Process its name.
Id. at 225. The Kimberley Process was officially accepted by the United Nations under G.A. Res.
55/56 pmbl. (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/diamonds/cl9974.htm (last visited Nov.
8, 2010) [hereinafter KPCS].
47. Fishman, supra note 2, at 224.
48. Id. at 224-25.
49. Kimberley Process Frequently Asked Questions,
http://kimberleyprocess.com/faqs/index en.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
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such conflicts."50  The KPCS is based on "simple and workable
certification" for rough diamonds," the standard of which is internationally
agreed upon.52 Perhaps the most glaring word of the preamble is
"voluntary." The KPCS is admittedly a voluntary system of self-regulation
that can only enjoy credibility to the extent that "all [p]articipants have
established internal systems of control designed to eliminate the presence of
conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, exporting[,] and importing
rough diamonds within their own territories . . ..
Section II of the KPCS states that each participant should ensure that: a
Kimberley Process Certificate (Certificate) accompany each export of rough
diamonds; its process for issuing Certificates meets the standard set out in
Section IV;5 4 the Certificate itself meets the requirements of Annex I; 5 and
50. KPCS, supra note 46, pmbl.
51. According to the definition provided by the KPCS, "'rough diamond' means diamonds
that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised
Commodity Description and Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 710.31." Id. § 1. Conspicuously
absent is the inclusion of polished diamonds, diamonds already included in jewelry, and other
precious stones. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes for why this is one of the KPCS's most
obvious shortcomings.
52. KPCS, supra note 46, pmbl.
5 3. Id.
54. Section IV outlines the recommended undertakings for internal controls, by stating that
each participant should:
(a) establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict
diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its
territories; (b) designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies); (c) ensure that
rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant containers; (d) as required,
amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the
Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for
transgressions; (e) collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export
data, and collate and exchange such data in accordance with the provisions of Section V;
(f) when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, where appropriate,
the further options and recommendations for internal controls as elaborated in Annex II.
Id. § IV.
55. Annex I requires the Certificate to at least contain the following information: "title
'Kimberley Process Certificate' and the following statement: 'The rough diamonds in this shipment
have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
for rough diamonds'; country of origin; English language translation (if Certificate is not printed in
English); unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code; tamper and forgery resistant; date of
issuance; date of expiry; issuing authority; identification of exporter or importer; carat weight/mass;
value in U.S. dollars; number of parcels in shipment; relevant Harmonised Commodity Description
and Coding System; and validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority. Id. Annex I(A).
215
9
Murphy: Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and More Sophistica
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2011
that the participant notify the other participants of the features of its
Certificate.56
Section III of the KPCS denotes the requisite undertakings with respect
to the international trade in rough diamonds." Specifically, each participant
should require that a valid Certificate accompany every exported shipment.58
It also requires that each imported shipment reaching a participant country
must be accompanied by a valid certificate, that a confirmation of receipt be
sent to the relevant exporting authority, and that the original Certificate be
accessible for a period of no less than three years.59 Participants must ensure
that no shipment of rough diamonds be imported or exported from a country
not participating in the KPCS.60  Lastly, shipments passing through
participant countries must leave the country in an identical way in which
they entered-that is to say "the shipment must be unopened and not
tampered with."61
Section IV denotes the internal controls to be taken by participating
62countries. Essentially, this section stresses the importance of establishing
proper authorities, maintaining internal controls, enforcing the requirement
that diamonds be transferred in tamper-resistant containers, maintaining
proper data on imports and exports, and establishing and maintaining
"dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions." Annex II,
providing more detailed recommendations relevant to Section IV, includes
the suggestion that, "Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel
groups suspected of mining diamonds within their territories are encouraged
to identify the areas of rebel diamond mining activity."" They are also
encouraged to name the companies or individuals convicted of activities in
violation of the KPCS. 5 Lastly, there is the recommendation that all cash
Section B of Annex I also provides "Optional Certificate Elements" including: characteristics of a
Certificate, quality characteristics of the shipped diamonds, and a recommended import confirmation
that should include the country of destination, identification of importer, carat/weight in U.S. dollars,
relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding system, date of receipt by Importing
Authority, and authentication by Importing Authority. Id. Annex I(B).
56. Id. § 11(c).
57. Id. § III.
58. Id. § III(a).
59. Id. § III(b).
60. Id. § III(c).
61. Id. § 111(d).
62. See supra note 55 for full text of document regarding Annex I.
63. KPCS, supra note 46, § IV(a}-(e).
64. Id Annex 11(5).
65. Id Annex 11(6).
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purchases be routed through "official banking channels." 6 Section V
outlines the regulations for "[cooperation] and transparency."
Section VI denotes the administrative matters of the KPCS.68 The
participants and observers meet in plenary annually, or more frequently if
deemed necessary, with the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the
KPCS.69 The meetings are held in the country in which the chair, who is
elected each year, resides.70  Ad hoc "working groups" may be formed
during these meetings for various purposes. 71 Regarding decision making,
the KPCS says only: "Participants are to reach decisions by consensus," and
when "consensus proves impossible, the Chair is to conduct consultations."72
The vagueness of this last statement is crippling, as will be discussed in
depth in Part VI."
The same section of the KPCS states that "[p]articipation in the
Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all
[a]pplicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that Scheme."74
Participants are expected to prepare reports explaining how the KPCS
requirements are being implemented in their countries. If further
clarification is deemed necessary, per the recommendation of the chair,
measures in accordance with national and international law may be
implemented. These measures include, but are not limited to, requests for
66. Id. Annex 11(7).
67. This section suggests that each participant should provide the others with synopses in
English of the relevant laws and procedures within its country. Id. § V(a). It encourages dialogue
regarding the best practices and suggestions for improvements in implementing the KPCS. Id. §
V(cHd). It also suggests a minimal watchdog requirement that participants inform the chair if they
believe the practices of another participant "do not ensure the absence of conflict diamonds," and
that there should be cooperation in resolving problems that arise "from unintentional circumstances .
. . which could lead to non-fulfillment of the minimum requirements for the issuance and acceptance
of the Certificates" Id. § V(e)-(f). Most obvious is the suggested cooperation amongst the relevant
officials of each participant. Id. § V(g).
68. Id § VI.
69. Id § VI(1).
70. Id § VI(3H4).
71. Id § VI(4).
72. Id § VI(5).
73. See infra Part VI for reasons why vague wording is problematic in this context.
74. KPCS, supra note 46, § VI(8). Applications to the KPCS should entail a request to the
chair through diplomatic means. Id. § VI(9). This request is then circulated to all participants within
one month of submission to the chair. Id.
75. Id § V(l 1), (13).
76. Id § V(13).
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additional information or review missions by other participants "where there
are credible indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification
Scheme."n These review missions are only conducted with the permission
of the participant concerned, and the circumstances of each suspected
transgression determine the "size, composition, terms of reference[,] and
time-frame" of the mission. 8
The KPCS includes just one paragraph regarding "compliance and
dispute prevention." 79  Essentially, when an issue regarding compliance
arises, concerned participants must notify the chair who is then responsible
for informing other participants "without delay" and to "enter into dialogue
on how to address it."80  Section VI calls for the periodic review of the
KPCS, specifically a three-year review, to be conducted in 2006.8' Annex
III of the KPCS requires participants to keep reliable and comparable data
on exportation and importation of rough diamonds for publishing and
compilation on a semi-annual basis. 82
VI. LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE KPCS
While the mere birth of the KPCS demonstrates a changing global
sentiment and commitment to both the rebuilding of Africa and the integrity
of trade on a global scale, it is severely limited by shortcomings that threaten
to cripple its long-term effectiveness. The document stands to be more
articulate, stem, and inclusive of delineated methods of dispute resolution.
A. Vague Wording
One of the most glaring shortcomings (it should be noted that this
problem is not unique to the KPCS, but rather is one that plagues most
international agreements) is vague wording and inarticulate direction. The
KPCS talks of "proportional penalties for transgressions" 83 but never
articulates what these penalties would be or how to ascertain the
proportionality to the transgression. The KPCS goes on to assert that
decisions be reached by "consensus," though it never states what types of
77. Id § V(13)(a)-(b).
78. Id. § V(14). A report of the mission is circulated to the chair and other participants within
three weeks of completion of the mission. Id. § V(15).
79. Id § V(16).
80. Id The KPCS also calls for participants and observers to make every effort to observe
strict confidentiality. Id.
81. Id § V(20).
82. Id Annex 111(a), (c).
83. Id. § IV(d).
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voting mechanisms should be used.84 It further states that if such
"consensus" cannot be reached, the chair should conduct consultations.
But what would these consultations entail? How would impartiality be
ensured? Is there a time frame for reaching some semblance of a conclusion
from these consultations? While these questions, and likely many more,
seem intuitive and worthy of concern, they are never addressed in the text of
the KPCS and thus leave the door open for confusion, word-play, and
prohibitive interpretation.
For another example of vague-or more appropriately, non-existent-
wording, look to the Compliance and Dispute Prevention Clause of Section
VI, 86 which includes just one paragraph to address the disputes that are
causing major conflict and war. Understandably, the dispute resolution
clauses and enforcement mechanisms of multinational treaties are often
opaque because of the difficulties faced in finding consensus. However, it is
worth spending the time to argue through and come to an agreement,
because without the dispute resolution aspect, the rest of the treaty faces the
prospect of disintegrating because of conflict among signatories.
Another glaring shortcoming, though not within the breadth of this
article, is that the KPCS's definition of "diamond" is excessively narrow and
"does not include polished stones and jewelry."87  This is problematic
because it allows diamonds that are smuggled or illicitly purchased to be
transformed, polished, turned into jewelry, and then imported to go virtually
undetected.
B. Voluntary Membership
Perhaps the most troubling shortcoming is the voluntary nature of the
KPCS. The KPCS relies "too heavily on Participants policing themselves"
and makes compliance with the KPCS voluntary, thus allowing countries to
ignore the recommendations provided to them by other participants and the
chair.89 Further, as the KPCS is neither treaty nor law, it has no effect in
non-member countries, including those that are members of the United
84. Id. § VI(5).
85. Id.
86. Id. § VI(16).
87. Petrova, supra note 34, at 954.
88. Id. at 954-55.
89. Malamut, supra note 5, at 47-49.
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Nations.90 Not only does this undermine the integrity of the KPCS by
demonstrating a lack of political will and compassion on the part of non-
members, it opens the door to a host of logistical issues including the use of
non-participating countries as corridors for smuggling diamonds from the
mines to the consumer nations.9 '
Lastly, the KPCS has run aground on some of the provisions of the
World Trade Organization that promotes freer movements of goods and the
promotion of "free trade." The crux of the issue here is that "without a ban
on trade with non-participants, the Kimberley Process could have no
significant effect." 92 However, a trade ban of this sort appears to be a "red-
flag violation" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
foundation of the World Trade Organization.93
As the system stands, the KPCS does not allow for private rights of
action by individuals against other individuals, companies, or countries in
violation of the KPCS.94 If this private cause of action were established,
industry leaders, as well as countries, would be able to participate more
aggressively in the system.95 Like other methods of prosecution, many
industry and government leaders would find the threat of suit deterrence
enough, looking to avoid bad press (an often fatal blow in the realm of
luxury goods). However, until the KPCS becomes formalized law, or at the
very least binding among its signatories, this cause of action remains a
fiction.
C. Lacking an Enforcement Mechanism
While in theory the goals of the initiative are sound and feasible, in
practice they will fail to solve the blood diamond trade problem. A system
90. "The KPCS is not a legally binding document, as matter of international law. However,
the KP Participant countries have considered it necessary to voluntarily fulfill the KPCS minimum
requirements at the national level and have adopted relevant laws and/or executive acts to that
effect." THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME: THIRD YEAR REVIEW 5 (Oct. 2006),
available at
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Kimbeley/20Process%20Thi
rd%20Yeaeo20Review/ 0 20%281-11-2006%29.pdf [hereinafter KPCS REVIEW].
91. Petrova, supra note 34, at 954. Weak countries essentially serve as gateways for
smuggling. Further, it provides a loophole of sorts with regards to the "country of origin"
specification; a rough diamond from the Ivory Coast, smuggled into non-participant Mali, and
transformed in Belgium or the United States now becomes "a polished diamond from Belgium or the
United States." Id.
92. Feldman, supra note 4, at 855.
93. Id.
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that requires no international watchdog or universal guidelines, and instead
merely suggests ways for nations to conduct their investigations and punish
violators, invites abuse and inefficiency. 6
In April 2003, at the first plenary meeting of the KPCS participants, it
was discovered that several participating countries failed to implement
regular and independent monitoring for all participants. 7 Despite this
shortcoming being called to light, no action was taken to establish any
regular monitoring systems. This inaction certainly diminishes the
credibility of the KPCS, a significant shortcoming given its short existence.
D. KPCS Third Year Review-Ineffective Implementation
In 2006, the KPCS compiled the results of a questionnaire circulated to
its participants in the form of a third-year review and critique of the
system.98 The review focused on three major areas: (1) the impact and
effectiveness of the KPCS "on the international trade in rough diamonds;"
(2) whether the technical provisions of the KPCS are adequate as planned or
require improvement; and (3) the effectiveness and efficiency of the
operations of the KPCS.99  Though the questionnaire returned largely
positive results, the major problem cited was the "effective implementation
of internal controls." 00 Essentially, as predicted by many, the KPCS was
great on paper but hard to implement without proper funding and clearer
guidelines. 01 The review also stated that there was a "lack of agreement on
non-compliance and the procedures for removing Participants that are
deemed to be in significant non-compliance with the KPCS." 02 While this
is certainly disconcerting, it demonstrates the discontent of some nations
with the KPCS and the need to continue dialogue on how to make the
dispute resolution aspect of the KPCS more effective.
The review notes the one occasion "on which the formal provisions of
the [Kimberly Process] for dispute resolution ha[s] been invoked." 03 In
2004, just one year after implementation, the Republic of Congo (ROC) was
96. Id. at 218.
97. See KPCS REVIEW, supra note 90, at 63.
98. See id. at 8-10.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id.
101. See generally id.
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found to be improperly issuing Certificates for over five million carats of
rough diamonds." A review mission confirmed these suspicions and
deemed the ROC to be in "major non-compliance of the KPCS."'O' One
month after this mission, the ROC was removed from the list of countries
participating in the KPCS.'06 While other participating countries were self-
congratulatory on the ROC's removal because it served to "enhance the
reputation" of the KPCS, the country now serves as a corridor of illegal
smuggling.'o7 This situation demonstrates that the removal of a rogue
country, while sparing the other participants a tarnished reputation, does
little to control the diamond trade or reign in the rebels.
The review also notes the Ivory Coast's dissatisfaction with the
KPCS.'os The Ivory Coast stated that the KPCS "has not effectively
responded to the mandate given by the relevant U.N. General Assembly
resolution to combat the threat of conflict diamonds, because, despite the
implementation of the [KPCS], Ivorian diamonds have been sold to the
international market without any sanctions for those involved in the
trade."' 09  The Ivory Coast expresses these sentiments despite KPCS
monitoring since early 2005, a special envoy of the KPCS chair, and
investigations conducted by the U.N. and Global Witness."0 While the
situation appears to have improved in other previously conflicted countries,
the KPCS is admittedly falling desperately short in the case of the Ivory
Coast."'
Zimbabwe is the most recent and relevant strain on the KPCS. In 2006,
diamonds were discovered in the Marange region of eastern Zimbabwe." 2
Since 2009, these diamonds have been denied certification because of clear
evidence that the military has overrun the area, with individuals rather than
legitimate government entities profiting from the diamonds, many of which
are being smuggled through neighboring Mozambique." 3 At the three day
104. Id. at 63.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id at 17.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 23-24 (sharing positive updates on countries, including the DRC, Sierra Leone,
and the Republic of Angola). But cf id. at 17-20 (discussing the failures of the KPCS in the Ivory
Coast).
112. Alan Cowell, Group Allows Limited Sale of Zimbabwe's Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2010, at A5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/africa/I7diamonds.html?ref=alan-cowell.
113. Sara Toth Stub, Talks Stall on Zimbabwe Diamonds, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2010, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704629804575325021274013424.html. If fully
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2010 plenary meeting of the KPCS held in Tel Aviv in June, KPCS
members could not come to a consensus on whether or not to certify
Zimbabwe's diamonds. 114 The definition of "conflict diamond" was a point
of contention-as it stands the definition includes diamonds sold to finance
anti-government rebel groups." 5  However, in Zimbabwe, where the
government controls the diamond mines, the issue is over reported human
rights violations at the hands of the government.1 16 For seemingly obvious
reasons, the definition should be amended to be inclusive of diamonds that
provide funding for groups known to violate human rights.
A follow-up visit to Zimbabwe in August 2010 resulted in approval of a
limited sale of diamonds after the monitor (a South African diamond expert)
revealed the diamonds to be "clean."' 17 The "limited" sale was for 900,000
carats of diamonds worth $72 million."' Whether the KPCS can handle the
situation in Zimbabwe remains to be seen. But what is clear is that if the
KPCS cannot control the diamond trade out of Zimbabwe, a large portion of
the world's diamonds will enter the market uncertified, thus allowing profits
to flow into the hands of governments that continue to violate human rights.
An atrocity of this magnitude would surely cripple the credibility of the
KPCS.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on these shortcomings and
offer suggestions for increasing efficiency so that the KPCS may function as
intended.
VII. WHAT WOULD THE ENHANCED KPCS LOOK LIKE?
Logistically, a modification of the KPCS would require consensus by
the participants and may be proposed in a written statement to the chair by
mined, diamonds from this region of Zimbabwe could make up twenty-five percent of the world's
supply of diamonds, valuing in the billions of dollars. Id
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Human Rights Watch, an NGO, has reported corruption, miners being forced to work
at gunpoint, and a massacre of 200 workers in 2008. Id.
117. Arthur Bright, Zimbabwe Restarts Diamond Sales Amid 'Blood Diamond' Accusations,
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any one of the participants, at least ninety days prior to the next plenary
meeting." 9
Substantively, the modification would call for a binding arbitration
agreement to replace the inefficient method of discussion and dialogue by
the chair. The method of dialogue and forum in which complaints would be
brought would need to be clear and not yield to the existing ad hoc working
groups. The arbitrators would come from participating countries-
observers,120 diamond industry experts, and counsel from the United Nations
and relevant private industry specializing in alternative forms of
adjudication.
The modification would also make the review missionsl21 required for
every member country, or at the very least, countries where conflicts are
continuing. While countries would still be able to voluntarily sign on to the
KPCS, this would require a relinquishing of power and privacy. However,
given the amount of money to be made from diamonds, even when sold
legally, which is admittedly less than when sold on black markets, this
would be a small price to pay to be able to certify one's diamonds as
legitimate, thus increasing their value in the consumer marketplace.
According to the KPCS Review, some participating countries believe
that "government monitoring and verification of industry compliance should
be made an explicit minimum requirement" of the KPCS.122 This
requirement, joined with a binding dispute resolution agreement, would
force participating countries to be policed by the KPCS. While for some this
steps on the toes of sovereignty, those committed to changing the diamond
industry for the proper reasons would find it a worthwhile sacrifice and
small price to pay.
The modification would also call for more specific punishments for
transgressing nations, individuals, or companies. The United Nations
Security Council is granted the power to administer sanctions under Chapter
VII of its Charter "to maintain or restore international peace and security." 23
KPCS participants in violation of the proposed binding agreement and
subsequent action taken by the proposed tribunal would face targeted
119. KPCS, supra note 46, § VI(17)-(18). The chair would then need to circulate the proposal
to all participants and observers and place it on the agenda of the next meeting. Id § VI(19).
120. As defined by the KPCS, "observer" means a "representative of civil society, the diamond
industry, international organizations and non-participating governments invited to take part in
Plenary meetings." Id. § I.
121. Id. § VI(14)-(15).
122. KPCS REVIEW, supra note 90, at 53.
123. UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, Security Council Sanctions Committees: An
Overview, www.un.org/sc/committees/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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sanctions by the United Nations.124 However, these sanctions would need to
be accompanied by major press coverage because ultimately it would be up
to the consumers to choose to stop purchasing diamonds from illegitimate,
sanctioned sources.
I suggest that the KPCS should use the dispute settlement scheme of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) as a model for increasing effectiveness
and achieving the aforementioned changes and goals. Such a system would
give much-needed teeth to the well intended but ultimately too soft KPCS.
A more effective dispute resolution system would make the KPCS more
legitimate, secure, and predictable.
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is applicable to the KPCS for
various reasons. The WTO provides a solid example for the KPCS as both
documents seek the same end-efficient and quick dispute resolution with
priority given to settling these disputes through consultation. 2 5 Further, the
nature of the disputes to be settled is similar enough to almost seamlessly
apply WTO standards to the KPCS.12 6  Lastly, the WTO previously
experienced many of the problems plaguing the KPCS-"no fixed
timetables," easily blocked rulings, and disputes and infractions that dragged
on "for a long time inconclusively." 27
The modifications to the WTO agreement, achieved at the Uruguay
Round, provided a "more structured process with more clearly defined
stages in the procedure." 28 This would be particularly helpful to the KPCS,
which, as it stands, has no distinct stages. Further, the KPCS lacks any real
structure because the dispute resolution is based on the actions of a chair
who changes every year and the ad hoc working groups who, by their
definition, are tailored to each situation. A case, under WTO standards,
124. Targeted sanctions are narrower than general comprehensive trade or economic sanctions.
Targeted sanctions can include freezing assets, blocking financial transactions by certain individuals
or organizations, and prohibiting the international movement of these individuals and organizations.
Id.
125. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique
Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2010) [hereinafter WTO Disputes].
126. The WTO identifies the crux of its disputes as "broken promises." Id. Specifically, a
"dispute arises when one country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or
more fellow-WTO members considers to be breaking the WTO agreement, or to be a failure to live
up to obligations." Id. Similarly, a dispute within the KPCS would consist of one country failing to
take proper policing action and thereby failing to live up to its obligation to regulate the diamond
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normally takes about one year-fifteen months if appealed.'29 While this
may seem lengthy given the transgressions that could continue during the
dispute process, it is unfortunately realistically indicative of the true
timeframe for both domestic disputes and disputes resolved in the U.N.,
barring any emergency or unilateral action. Rulings under the WTO are
automatically adopted unless a consensus rejects it.'o That is to say that any
country, including the parties to the dispute, must convince all other
members to move to block the settlement.131 In the WTO, unlike the KPCS,
the action stands unless opposed. In the KPCS, the action must be actively
agreed upon by the member states before it would become effective.
Clearly, the WTO arrangement provides for swifter dispute resolution.
The KPCS would need to adopt a standing dispute resolution body
similar to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. It would be the sole
authority of this body to create a panel of experts to hear the case. It would
also be this body's responsibility to accept or reject the ultimate decision at
the conclusion of the proceedings.132 Some participating countries of the
KPCS have already "expressed interest in a dedicated, funded,
administrative body to work in close collaboration" with the chair.133 While
some other participants oppose the creation of such a body for fear of
bureaucratic slowdown, it should be noted that with ineffectiveness running
as high as it is, a slow pace from a functioning body is better than the current
stagnation resulting from the inexistence of such a body.
The first stage in the KPCS's new dispute settlement procedure, as
adopted from the WTO, would be consultation that could last up to sixty
days. 134 The KPCS chair would be the initial mediator in this consultation.
He would be able to request assistance from experts or outside counsel from
other observers, participating countries, or both, if he felt that he was either
unfit or biased in the matter.
The second stage of the dispute resolution process would be the panel.
There would be a set number of days-in the case of the WTO it is forty-
five-in which the panel would be composed and another six months for the
panel to examine and ultimately conclude on its findings.135 The dispute





133. KPCS REVIEW, supra note 90, at 58.
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and further, it would be at the discretion of the complaining party to ask for
the appointment of such panel.'36
It is the job of the panel to assist the settlement body in drafting a ruling.
As to the workings of the panel, each side would initially present its case in
writing and then make its case at a "first hearing."3 The hearings would
proceed with opportunities for rebuttals and the presentation of experts. 138
The panel then provides both sides with interim reports that they can review,
and then ultimately provides them with a final report that is circulated to the
disputing parties and the rest of the organization's members.13 9 The report
would then become a ruling within sixty days unless the other members
reject it.140 The new system would also include a method of appeal.141
I suggest the WTO dispute resolution agreement as a jumping off point
and functioning model. The KPCS would require modifications, some of
which have been previously discussed, to tailor the settlement to its
particular needs. What cannot be compromised, however, are the
timeframes within which disputes are resolved, and the binding nature of
both becoming a signatory and the subsequent process of adjudicating
disputes and distributing justice.
VIII.CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the KPCS is representative of a good faith effort and
acknowledgement on the part of many of the plight of the African nations
that are cursed with diamond-rich land. However, the six-year-old KPCS
stands to undergo modifications including an all-out revamping of its means
of enforcing provisions and keeping participating countries in line.
In the end, the African continent is plagued with troubles that far exceed






141. Id Appeals would have to be based on points of law and could not involve a reweighing
of the evidence or presentation of new issues. Id. A three-member panel of a permanent seven-
member body created specifically for the purpose of handling appeals would hear the appeal. Id.
The members of this panel would come from participating countries, though they would be experts,
lawyers, and not politically affiliated with any government. Id. The appeal would not last more than
sixty days, and the dispute settlement body would have to accept or reject it within thirty days of the
new holding. Id. Again, rejection would only be possible by a consensus of the members. Id
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diamond trade would provide these countries with lucrative business-the
profits of which could be used to tackle the other pressing issues of
infrastructure rebuilding, education, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and extreme
poverty. With this said, regaining a hold of the diamond mines is absolutely
crucial.
But even if the KPCS enacts more stringent rules, it will come down to
the consumers to ultimately drive the rebels out of business. Feldman has
alluded to the economics that presumably would accomplish this end.142
Ultimately, the mining, transportation, and sale of blood diamonds carry a
huge risk, and "[t]hose who incur the increased risk will want to be paid a
large premium for doing so. But the buyer of illegal diamonds will want to
pay a lower price for goods that lack legitimate credentials." 43 Literally, the
clean diamonds would drive the blood diamonds out of the market. 14 4
However, this theory relies heavily on an educated and compassionate
consumer. But the problem in America and other parts of the world is that
the atrocities of blood diamonds break into Western media channels with
pathetic infrequency. Consumers need to be educated not only of the
atrocities being committed to harvest these diamonds but also on the
illegality of the process that turns these rough diamonds into shiny
engagement rings. They must also be educated on the KPCS itself and how
and where to obtain properly certified stones. While many jewelers claim to
sell only the best in quality and origin-certainly no one would advertise
their diamonds coming from illegitimate sources-the conflicts in Africa
still rage on. Clearly, there is a disconnect between the message consumers
are hearing and the legal logistics of truly cleaning up the diamond industry.
At the end of the day, the participating governments, as well as the diamond
industry heavy hitters, will have to find a vested interest in the plight of the
African nations and the integrity of consumers before major changes will
occur.
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